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Abstract
Ample evidence exists to suggest that the death penalty in the United States is affected by
racial bias. Nebraska has a complex history with the death penalty, and in this study I investigate
whether or not that racial bias is present in Nebraska’s capital punishment. Using a list of every
Nebraska Department of Correctional Services inmate since 1982, I test for a relationship
between race of inmate and sentencing outcome and a relationship between race of victim and
sentencing outcome. No significant relationship was found between either race of inmate and
receiving the death penalty nor race of victim and receiving the death penalty. Continued
research in this area is necessary to determine whether or not racial bias can truly be ruled out of
the administration of the death penalty in Nebraska.
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Racial Bias and the Death Penalty in Nebraska (2005-2019)
Nebraska has a complicated history with capital punishment. Beginning in 1981, there
has been a bill to abolish the death penalty introduced in every legislative session. Most recently,
in 2015, the Nebraska Unicameral Legislature passed one of those bills and overrode the
governor’s veto of it. Then in 2016 the ballot included a question asking Nebraska voters
whether they wanted to retain the legislature’s repeal of the death penalty or repeal that repeal
(thereby restoring capital punishment in the state). The latter option won and thus the death
penalty once again became an option in Nebraska. Just two years later, in 2018, the state
executed Carey Dean Moore. Moore’s execution was the state’s first in decades (“Nebraska”).
One of the major arguments for abolishing the death penalty is that it disproportionately
affects people of color. This bias may be a result of the defendant’s race but most often stems
from the race of the victim. However, the late Dr. David Baldus (who was one of the nation’s
leading experts in death penalty research) conducted a study of decision-making in the 691
homicide cases in Nebraska between 1973 and 1999 and found no significant evidence of
disparate treatment based either on the race of the defendant or the race of the victim (Baldus and
Young 2002). Some other researchers have also failed to find such evidence: for example, one
study of a thirty year period in Tennessee found that, after controlling for a variety of relevant
factors (such as motive, place, and number of victims), neither the race of the defendant nor the
race of the victim played significant roles in determining whether or not the defendant received
the death penalty (Scheb, Lyons, and Wagers 2008). Gilboa (2010) is skeptical of the existence
of this alleged racial bias; according to his work, the “white victim effect” (whereby defendants
accused of killing white victims are more likely to get the death penalty than defendants accused
of killing black victims) is actually merely an unintended consequence of the fact that defendants
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in the most populous counties of states are less likely to receive the death penalty than
defendants who live in the rest of the counties. According to Gilboa, evidence does not support a
racial bias in the administration of the death penalty, and the fact that experts have been unable
to prove this bias ought to be sufficient to show that it does not exist.
Despite these claims, there are numerous studies that present evidence of racial bias in
the administration of the death penalty. Spohn (2015) summarizes both historical and
contemporary evidence of racial disparity in the criminal justice system of the United States,
highlighting the especial history between the death penalty and racial bias. Johnson (2003)
explores potential reasons why this bias has continued to exist and finds three factors to be
influential: 1) the often unconscious and unsympathetic nature of racial prejudice today; 2) the
indeterminate and complicated nature of the decision to impose capital punishment; and 3) the
lack of legal remedies for racial discrimination in this area. Although many studies evaluate data
from actual capital sentencing patterns, Lynch and Haney (2011) conducted an experiment in
order to investigate racial bias in the death penalty, focusing in particular on the effect of white
male jurors on outcomes. The experiment found that the presence of white male jurors caused
black defendants to be more likely to receive the death penalty. Juries with higher concentrations
of white males were more likely than other juries to vote for death for black defendants; these
juries were also more likely to give black defendants a death sentence than white defendants.
This was because white male jurors were significantly more likely to weigh aggravating factors
more heavily in cases with black defendants than those with white defendants. They were also
less likely to agree with mitigating factors in black defendants’ cases. Given that whites are
overrepresented on juries, this is an alarming finding.
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Other studies have investigated racial bias in national sentencing patterns. For example,
there is evidence that, in comparison with judges, juries are less concerned with the details of the
circumstances of the crime and more susceptible to racial biases, both with regard to the
defendant’s race and the victim’s (Iyengar 2011). This is especially relevant because of the way
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona changed sentencing schemes across the country,
and given that juries were found to be more willing to sentence defendants to death than judges
were (Iyengar 2011). A different study found that black representation on death row in the
United States is actually lower than black representation in the population of murder offenders
(Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells 2004). That particular finding is troubling given that there are
many more cases in which both the defendant and the victim are black than cases with any other
racial combination—black defendant / black victim cases are underrepresented on death row,
implying that the criminal justice system may not value black victims as much as white victims.
The fact that death penalty rates in black defendant / white victim cases far exceed rates in black
defendant / black victim and white defendant / white victim cases only reinforces that concern.
Baumgartner and his colleagues found further evidence of this victim bias by studying
the US from 1976 until 2014; during that time period, defendants accused of killing white
victims were four times likelier to be executed than accused killers of blacks (Baumgartner et al.
2016). Additionally, killers of blacks had an execution rate less than 1/13th that of defendants
accused of killing white females. Although whites made up only about half of homicide victims
(while blacks made up 37% of homicide victims compared to their 6% share of the US
population), white victims were about 75% of the execution cases. Again, blacks were more
likely to face the death penalty when they were accused of killing whites than when they were
accused of killing blacks (the pattern held for whites accused as well). Evidence of racial bias
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has also been found among the administration of the death penalty in the military. The universe
of cases to study was small (a sample size of n = 97 in the years 1985-2005 with only 15 death
sentences); however, systemic racial disparities were found, with both race of victim and race of
defendant having effects (Baldus et al. 2011).
Aside from these nationwide studies, the South (perhaps unsurprisingly) is a common
region in which researchers have found racial bias in the death penalty. Using judicial errors (a
sentencing was considered an error when a superior court reversed the decision of the sentencing
court) as a measure of racial bias, Alesina and La Ferrara (2014) found a bias in the South as a
region against minority defendants who killed white victims. Other studies have found individual
states in the South to suffer from similar biases. For instance, two different studies have shown
race-of-victim effects on the administration of the death penalty in North Carolina. The first
studied a shorter amount of time (1993-1997) and found that, even after controlling for
mitigating and aggravating factors, defendants in North Carolina were significantly more likely
to get the death penalty if their victim was white, as opposed to non-white (Unah and Boger
2001). A second study covering North Carolina from 1980-2007 found that defendants suspected
of killing white people were over three times more likely to be sentenced to death than those
suspected of killing blacks. Additionally, when the focus was narrowed to just white victims,
black suspects were twice as likely to receive a death sentence as white suspects. These patterns
remained even after controlling for additional factors (Radelet and Pierce 2011).
North Carolina is not the only state that has shown a racial bias with respect to the death
penalty. In neighboring South Carolina from 1993-1997, prosecutors were three times more
likely to seek the death penalty in cases with white victims than in cases with black victims
(Songer and Unah 2006). Louisiana also demonstrated disturbing patterns with regard to race and
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the death penalty. Baumgartner and Lyman (2015) found that, from 1976-2015, killers of white
females were twelve times more likely to be sentenced to death and 48 times more likely to be
executed than killers of black males. In fact, the authors did not find a single case in the whole
history of Louisiana where a white person was executed for killing a black male. This fits with
the modern era pattern of whites being 26% of homicide victims but 64% of the victims in death
sentence cases and 79% of the victims in cases that end in execution (Baumgartner and Lyman
2015).
Other states outside of the South have also demonstrated racial biases in the
administration of the death penalty. In Colorado, for instance, actual executions are exceedingly
rare. However, from 1999-2010, prosecutors there were five times more likely to seek the death
penalty against minority defendants than they were against white defendants (Beardsley et al.
2015). Race maintained a significant impact even after controlling for place of the crime and
heinousness. The problem was especially acute, however, in the Eighteenth Judicial District:
prosecutors sought death for 15.9% of minority defendants there and for 0% of white defendants.
Ohio has also displayed evidence of racial bias. From 1981-1997, offenders who killed black
males, those who killed white males, and those who killed black females were all significantly
less likely to receive a death sentence than offenders who killed white females (Holcomb,
Williams, and Demuth 2004). In fact, the odds of a case with a black male victim resulting in a
death sentence were 78% less than those of cases with white female victims. However, in 1996
new sentencing guidelines were put into place in Ohio; one group of scholars (Wooldredge et al.
2011) studied race and sentencing in Ohio by comparing pre-guideline data with data from after
the guidelines were put into effect. Pre-guideline data showed that black men indicted for crimes
against whites experienced greater disadvantages in presentence dispositions and received longer
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sentences than offenders involved in other racial combinations. Post-guideline data showed,
however, that both of these disadvantages disappeared (Wooldredge et al. 2011).
Given the large amount of evidence of racial disparity in administration of the death
penalty, reevaluating Nebraska’s situation with more current statistics will add valuable
information to the existing body of knowledge.
Methods
In order to conduct this study, I began with a list of all of the inmates under Nebraska
Department of Correctional Services custody since about 1982, downloaded from the Nebraska
Department of Correctional Services website. Relevant information retrieved from the document
included the name, date of birth, race, and gender of the inmate; the offense committed by the
inmate and the county in which that offense was committed; and the date the inmate’s sentence
began and whether or not that sentence included capital punishment. Unfortunately, the
document included no further information about the inmates’ trials (e.g. whether or not they had
been tried capitally). I narrowed this document down to only those inmates whose offense was
murder in the first degree (as that is the only crime for which one can receive the death penalty in
the state of Nebraska) and whose sentence began in 2005 or later. From this starting point I used
online newspapers to research further details about the crimes, including the inmate’s age when
the crime was committed; the number of victims; and the victims’ genders, races, and ages. Even
via this method of research there was no reliable way of determining which inmates had been
tried capitally and which had not, so this analysis compares inmates who received the death
penalty with all inmates who were found guilty of murder in the first degree but did not receive
capital punishment.
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During this research, I eliminated from the analysis six inmates who were ineligible to
receive the death penalty because they were younger than 18 years old at the time the murder
was committed. Additionally, in the 2012 case Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court of the
United States declared that mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders are unconstitutional. Because of this, a number of inmates were resentenced during the
years this study covers; these inmates were eliminated from the list due to the fact that all were
younger than 18 years old at the time the murders were committed. At times, the race of the
victim(s) simply could not be found. This was the case for nine of the inmates’ victims, usually
those whose crimes had been committed during the earliest years of the timespan covered in this
study. These inmates were excluded from the test involving victims’ races but included in every
other part of the analysis. The ages of two inmates’ victims were unavailable; these inmates were
similarly excluded from the test involving victims’ ages but included in every other part of the
analysis. One inmate had to be excluded from all tests due to a complete lack of information
about the murder. At this point in the process, only four of the remaining inmates were females,
none of which had been sentenced to death. Because of this very small sample size and because
females are likely to be treated differently in trials than males, the four female inmates were
eliminated from the data set.
Among the remaining 106 inmates, 29 were white (27.36%), 56 were black (52.83%), 17
were Hispanic (16.04%), and four were Native American (3.77%). However, for the purposes of
this study, the inmates were sorted into groups of either “white” or “nonwhite” (which included
black, Native American, and Hispanic). Thus, 77 inmates were classified as nonwhite (72.64%)
and 29 as white (27.36%). The race of the victims was similarly categorized into white and
nonwhite. Studies have shown that one thing that is important in whether or not a defendant
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receives the death penalty is if their victim is white, so the other categories of race would be
treated similarly, with no need to differentiate (e.g. Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells 2004;
Baumgartner et al. 2016; Alesina and La Ferrara 2014). Cases with multiple victims sometimes
included victims of different races; in these instances, if there was at least one white victim the
case as a whole was labeled white for victim race, because the decisionmakers would still have at
least one white victim to empathize with. There were 47 cases with white victims (44.34%) and
50 cases with nonwhite victims (47.17%; the discrepancy in count results from the nine cases in
which victim race was unavailable).
Age of the inmates at the time of the crimes was determined by looking at the date the
crime was committed in comparison with the inmates’ birthdates (M = 30.53, SD = 10.80). News
articles consistently mentioned the ages of the victims (M = 33.03, SD = 17.24). There were two
types of cases with multiple victims as they pertain to victim age. In the first, all of the victims
were similar ages; in these cases the victim ages were averaged together to make the analysis
smoother. The second type of case involved one victim that was a notable age, such as 90 years
old or 4 years old. Because murders of defenseless people are usually seen as more heinous, and
because children and the elderly are seen as more defenseless, I chose to include only the notable
ages of those groups rather than averaging the group age. To illustrate the need for this, imagine
one inmate who had killed a 22-year-old and a 24-year-old, and another inmate who had killed a
36-year-old and a ten-year-old. Although the average age of these two sets of victims would be
23 for both, people would undoubtedly view one very differently from the other. The number of
victims was also consistently included in news articles (M = 1.32, SD = 0.64).
Because location has been shown to have effects on the administration of the death
penalty (e.g. Beardsley et al. 2015; Gilboa 2010), I also took county into consideration. Douglas,
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Sarpy, Lancaster, Hall, and Buffalo were classified as “urban” counties, and every other county
was classified as “rural.” In total, 19 of the inmates (17.92%) committed their offenses in rural
counties and 87 of the inmates (82.08%) committed their offenses in urban counties. Finally, I
took gender of the victims into account. Gender of the victims raised a similar issue to that which
race of the victims had brought about: when an inmate had killed more than one person, they
were not always the same gender. Any set of victims that included at least one female victim was
classified as “female.” This was done because studies show that people who are accused of
killing females are more likely to receive the death penalty (Baumgartner et al. 2016;
Baumgartner and Lyman 2015). If, then, an inmate is accused of killing a female and other
people, this is likely to be viewed as worse than killing the woman; it would be more similar to
all female victims than to all male victims. As a result, 40 of the victim sets were classified as
female (37.74%) and 66 of the victim sets were entirely male (62.26%).
The dependent variable of this study was whether or not the inmate had received the
death penalty. Only five inmates had received the death penalty (4.72%) while the remaining 101
did not (95.28%).
Results and Discussion
In order to test for racial bias in the administration of the death penalty, I ran a binary
logistic regression on SPSS. The test yielded a Cox and Snell’s R² value of 0.142 and a
Nagelkerke’s R² value of 0.448. Few of the control variables have significant relationships with
whether or not the inmate received the death penalty. Rural county crimes were more likely to
receive the death penalty than urban county crimes (B = 0.781, SE = 1.507, Sig. = 0.604),1 but

1

B is the beta value and represents the nature of the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables. SE is the standard error and represents how spread out the data is. The Sig. value (also known as the pvalue) is the probability of finding the same results when there is truly no difference between those who receive
the death penalty and those who do not. Traditionally, a Sig. value less than 0.05 indicates significance.
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not significantly so. Contrary to previous findings, inmates who had received the death penalty
tended to have more male victims than female victims (B = -1.571, SE = 1.431, Sig. = 0.272),
though again, not significantly more. Victim age was negatively associated with the inmate
receiving the death penalty (B = -0.048, SE = 1.599, Sig. = 0.307), but not significantly so.
The age of the inmate at the time the crime was committed was positively associated with
receiving the death penalty (B = 0.098, SE = 0.058, Sig. = 0.089). This relationship was much
closer to being significant than the previously mentioned variables. One can imagine that, had
more inmates committed their murders at an advanced age (65 and above, for example), these
results would have looked different: the way people view elderly people may lead them to be less
likely to sentence said elderly people to death. Finally, the control variable that had a statistically
significant relationship with whether or not the defendant received the death penalty was the
number of victims (B = 1.827, SE = 0.756, Sig. = 0.016). Logically speaking, this makes sense.
In Nebraska a defendant can only be sentenced to the death penalty for the crime of murder in
the first and when the aggravating factors of the situation outweigh the mitigating factors (see
Appendix for statutes). One aggravating factor is if the offender committed another murder at the
time the murder was committed. Thus, if an inmate killed more than one person it makes sense
that he would then be more likely to receive the death penalty.
As for the hypotheses that an inmate being nonwhite would be positively associated with
receiving the death penalty and that a victim being white would be positively associated with the
inmate receiving the death penalty, the results do not fully support either of these conclusions.
Although being nonwhite was positively associated with receiving the death penalty (B = 1.589,
SE = 1.619, Sig. = 0.326), the relationship was not statistically significant. The race of the victim,
though not under the traditional p-value of 0.05, did have a relationship with whether or not the
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inmate received the death penalty: inmates with white victims were more likely to receive the
death penalty than inmates with nonwhite victims (B = -2.763, SE = 1.599, Sig. = 0.084). A
bigger sample size may have produced more significant results. After all, there were only five

inmates who had received the death penalty: one white inmate and four nonwhite inmates; these
inmates had four sets of white victims and only one nonwhite victim. There is something to be
said for the fact that 80% of the inmates on death row from this time period were people of color
and 80% of them had white victims, despite the fact that the sample size was so small that
statistical significance would have been exceptionally difficult to attain. Especially given that, of
Nebraska’s twelve inmates currently on death row, nine are nonwhite and eight had white
victims (relatively similar percentages—75% and 66.67%, respectively), ruling out racial bias is
not yet an option.
Conclusion

Table 1. Race of victims and inmates
White

Nonwhite

Capital punishment is a serious undertaking. The

Inmate

1

4

state killing its citizens, under whatever circumstances,

Victim

4

1

is not something to be taken lightly. It is therefore

important, given the existing literature on racial bias in the administration of the death penalty as
well as the lasting legacy of slavery and Jim Crow, that scholars continue to keep the
government in check. This study did not find statistically significant evidence of racial bias
towards nonwhite perpetrators in the administration of the death penalty in Nebraska. With
regard to the race of the victims, there is slight evidence of racial bias in Nebraska’s death
penalty though not quite at a significant level.
However, this study is far from the end of the discussion of racial bias, the death penalty,
and Nebraska. Future researchers still have much work to do. For instance, one serious limitation
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of this study was the small sample size; expanding upon the years included in analysis as much
as possible would be helpful. Another way to expand the sample size would be to compare cases
in which prosecutors sought the death penalty with cases in which they did not seek capital
punishment, rather than simply comparing the inmates who were actually sentenced to death
with those who were not. Prosecutors are allowed a lot of discretion, and this method would
provide insight into how this discretion can affect the biases of the criminal justice system.
Many studies similar to this one (Alesina and La Ferrara 2014; Baumgartner et al. 2016;
Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells 2004; Holcomb, Williams, and Demuth 2004; etc.) used the FBI’s
Supplementary Homicide Reports to provide data for their analysis. Although these reports could
not be accessed in the case of this study, future researchers would benefit from using them in
their analysis of Nebraska’s death penalty. The reports would be especially useful for cases in
earlier years, in which less information is readily available online about homicide victims.
Effectively studying the death penalty in Nebraska also requires a careful analysis of
which cases were eligible for the death penalty and which were not. Due to the resources
available and the nature of this project, these determinations were not as carefully made as would
be ideal. Each case ought to be evaluated for its aggravating and mitigating factors. The
researcher should take into account whether or not the death penalty was constitutional at the
time (e.g., after Furman v. Georgia (1972) it was not); whether the state had a way to execute
offenders at that time (the Nebraska Supreme Court decided in 2008 that the electric chair, the
state’s only method of execution at the time, was unconstitutional); and whether or not the death
penalty was an option at the time (in 2015 the state legislature abolished the death penalty, but it
was brought back by a ballot referendum in 2016). Sufficiently narrowing down the number of
perpetrators to only those who were realistically eligible to receive the death penalty would
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benefit the study greatly and would make the small number of offenders sentenced to the death
penalty (or the small numbers against which prosecutors sought the death penalty) less of a
problem in the analysis. The people of Nebraska have voted to maintain capital punishment, but
researchers must work to ensure that it is not being carried out in a racially biased way.
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Appendix
29-2519.
Statement of intent.
(1) The Legislature hereby finds that it is reasonable and necessary to establish mandatory
standards for the imposition of the sentence of death; that the imposition of the death penalty in
every instance of the commission of the crimes specified in section 28-303 fails to allow for
mitigating factors which may dictate against the penalty of death; and that the rational imposition
of the death sentence requires the establishment of specific legislative guidelines to be applied in
individual cases by the court. The Legislature therefor determines that the death penalty should
be imposed only for the crimes set forth in section 28-303 and, in addition, that it shall only be
imposed in those instances when the aggravating circumstances existing in connection with the
crime outweigh the mitigating circumstances, as set forth in sections 29-2520 to 29-2524.
(2) The Legislature hereby finds and declares that:
(a) The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona (2002) requires that
Nebraska revise its sentencing process in order to ensure that rights of persons accused of murder
in the first degree, as required under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, are protected;
(b) The changes made by Laws 2002, LB 1, Ninety-seventh Legislature, Third Special Session,
are intended to be procedural only in nature and ameliorative of the state's prior procedures for
determination of aggravating circumstances in the sentencing process for murder in the first
degree;
(c) The changes made by Laws 2002, LB 1, Ninety-seventh Legislature, Third Special Session,
are not intended to alter the substantive provisions of sections 28-303 and 29-2520 to 29-2524;
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(d) The aggravating circumstances defined in section 29-2523 have been determined by the
United States Supreme Court to be "functional equivalents of elements of a greater offense" for
purposes of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right, as applied to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to a jury determination of such aggravating circumstances, but the aggravating
circumstances are not intended to constitute elements of the crime generally unless subsequently
so required by the state or federal constitution; and
(e) To the extent that such can be applied in accordance with state and federal constitutional
requirements, it is the intent of the Legislature that the changes to the murder in the first degree
sentencing process made by Laws 2002, LB 1, Ninety-seventh Legislature, Third Special
Session, shall apply to any murder in the first degree sentencing proceeding commencing on or
after November 23, 2002.

28-303.
Murder in the first degree; penalty.
A person commits murder in the first degree if he or she kills another person (1) purposely and
with deliberate and premeditated malice, or (2) in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any
sexual assault in the first degree, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking of any public or private
means of transportation, or burglary, or (3) by administering poison or causing the same to be
done; or if by willful and corrupt perjury or subornation of the same he or she purposely procures
the conviction and execution of any innocent person. The determination of whether murder in the
first degree shall be punished as a Class I or Class IA felony shall be made pursuant to sections
29-2519 to 29-2524.
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29-2524.
Sections; how construed.
Nothing in sections 25-1140.09, 28-303, 28-313, and 29-2519 to 29-2546 shall be in any way
deemed to repeal or limit existing procedures for automatic review of capital cases, nor shall they
in any way limit the right of the Supreme Court to reduce a sentence of death to a sentence of life
imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of section 29-2308, nor shall they limit the right
of the Board of Pardons to commute any sentence of death to a sentence of life imprisonment.

29-2520.
Aggravation hearing; procedure.
(1) Whenever any person is found guilty of a violation of section 28-303 and the information
contains a notice of aggravation as provided in section 29-1603, the district court shall, as soon
as practicable, fix a date for an aggravation hearing to determine the alleged aggravating
circumstances. If no notice of aggravation has been filed, the district court shall enter a sentence
of life imprisonment.
(2) Unless the defendant waives his or her right to a jury determination of the alleged
aggravating circumstances, such determination shall be made by:
(a) The jury which determined the defendant's guilt; or
(b) A jury impaneled for purposes of the determination of the alleged aggravating circumstances
if:
(i) The defendant waived his or her right to a jury at the trial of guilt and either was convicted
before a judge or was convicted on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere; or
(ii) The jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged.
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A jury required by subdivision (2)(b) of this section shall be impaneled in the manner provided
in sections 29-2004 to 29-2010.
(3) The defendant may waive his or her right to a jury determination of the alleged aggravating
circumstances. The court shall accept the waiver after determining that it is made freely,
voluntarily, and knowingly. If the defendant waives his or her right to a jury determination of the
alleged aggravating circumstances, such determination shall be made by a panel of judges as a
part of the sentencing determination proceeding as provided in section 29-2521.
(4)(a) At an aggravation hearing before a jury for the determination of the alleged aggravating
circumstances, the state may present evidence as to the existence of the aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information. The Nebraska Evidence Rules shall apply at the
aggravation hearing.
(b) Alternate jurors who would otherwise be discharged upon final submission of the cause to the
jury shall be retained during the deliberation of the defendant's guilt but shall not participate in
such deliberations. Such alternate jurors shall serve during the aggravation hearing as provided in
section 29-2004 but shall not participate in the jury's deliberations under this subsection.
(c) If the jury serving at the aggravation hearing is the jury which determined the defendant's
guilt, the jury may consider evidence received at the trial of guilt for purposes of reaching its
verdict as to the existence or nonexistence of aggravating circumstances in addition to the
evidence received at the aggravation hearing.
(d) After the presentation and receipt of evidence at the aggravation hearing, the state and the
defendant or his or her counsel may present arguments before the jury as to the existence or
nonexistence of the alleged aggravating circumstances.
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(e) The court shall instruct the members of the jury as to their duty as jurors, the definitions of
the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, and the state's burden to prove the
existence of each aggravating circumstance alleged in the information beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(f) The jury at the aggravation hearing shall deliberate and return a verdict as to the existence or
nonexistence of each alleged aggravating circumstance. Each aggravating circumstance shall be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Each verdict with respect to each alleged aggravating
circumstance shall be unanimous. If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict with respect
to an aggravating circumstance, such aggravating circumstance shall not be weighed in the
sentencing determination proceeding as provided in section 29-2521.
(g) Upon rendering its verdict as to the determination of the aggravating circumstances, the jury
shall be discharged.
(h) If no aggravating circumstance is found to exist, the court shall enter a sentence of life
imprisonment. If one or more aggravating circumstances are found to exist, the court shall
convene a panel of three judges to hold a hearing to receive evidence of mitigation and sentence
excessiveness or disproportionality as provided in subsection (3) of section 29-2521.

29-2523.
Aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in sections 29-2519 to 29-2524 shall be
as follows:
(1) Aggravating Circumstances:
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(a) The offender was previously convicted of another murder or a crime involving the use or
threat of violence to the person, or has a substantial prior history of serious assaultive or
terrorizing criminal activity;
(b) The murder was committed in an effort to conceal the commission of a crime, or to conceal
the identity of the perpetrator of such crime;
(c) The murder was committed for hire, or for pecuniary gain, or the defendant hired another to
commit the murder for the defendant;
(d) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by
ordinary standards of morality and intelligence;
(e) At the time the murder was committed, the offender also committed another murder;
(f) The offender knowingly created a great risk of death to at least several persons;
(g) The victim was a public servant having lawful custody of the offender or another in the
lawful performance of his or her official duties and the offender knew or should have known that
the victim was a public servant performing his or her official duties;
(h) The murder was committed knowingly to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of the laws; or
(i) The victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his or her
official duties as a law enforcement officer and the offender knew or reasonably should have
known that the victim was a law enforcement officer.
(2) Mitigating Circumstances:
(a) The offender has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(b) The offender acted under unusual pressures or influences or under the domination of another
person;
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(c) The crime was committed while the offender was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance;
(d) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(e) The offender was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person and his or her
participation was relatively minor;
(f) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act; or
(g) At the time of the crime, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a
result of mental illness, mental defect, or intoxication.
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